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JOINT VENTURES AND REAL
OPTIONS: AN INTEGRATED
PERSPECTIVE
Ilya R. P. Cuypers and Xavier Martin
ABSTRACT
We provide a comprehensive synthesis and extension of the real option
(RO) literature on joint ventures (JVs), contributing in three main areas.
First, we examine major alternative theoretical perspectives on JVs –
learning, bargaining, transaction cost and agency theory – to elaborate
how they complement or contradict RO predictions. Second, we compare
arguments and variables used to explain different JV stages – initial RO
explicitness and equity shares, JV stability, and performance consequences
– and highlight research opportunities. Third, we discuss and extend re-
search about behavioral aspects of making RO (JV) investments. Overall,
we offer new predictions and suggestions for a better integration within the
RO literature, and between RO and related literatures on JVs.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, real option (RO) theory has emerged as an important
approach to understand and value strategy under uncertainty. Accordingly,
Real Options Theory
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numerous types of investments such as R&D projects, taking out patents,
investing in human capital, subcontracting, and entering into joint ven-
tures (JVs), which are all characterized by uncertain outcomes, have been
studied from an RO perspective (e.g. Bowman & Moskowitz, 2001; Chi &
Levitas, 2007; Nerkar, Paruchuri, & Khaire, 2007; Fister & Seth, 2007;
Van Mieghem, 1999; Reuer & Leiblein, 2000).
In this paper, we focus on one type of investment, namely JVs, which we
deﬁne as equity-based collaborative arrangements whereby two or more or-
ganizations each contribute resources, including equity, for the joint pursuit
of economic goals (Martin & Salomon, 2003b). It has long been established
that ﬁrms often use JVs to enter into unfamiliar and risky product markets
and geographic areas (Aharoni, 1966; Harrigan, 1988). Accordingly, though
JVs may vary in their form and functional purpose(s), they are generally
surrounded by high levels of uncertainty (Martin, Mitchell, & Swaminathan,
1995; Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006).1 This is especially – but not
exclusively – the case for international joint ventures (IJVs), which are sub-
ject to powerful sources of uncertainty such as cultural differences and the
burdens of operating across multiple locations and jurisdictions (e.g., Martin
& Salomon, 2002, 2003a; Reuer & Tong, 2005).2 Furthermore, JVs allow for,
and are subject to, ongoing adjustments in the terms of the agreement (and
the relationship among parent ﬁrms). These features make JVs – and IJVs in
particular – both suitable and important to study from an RO perspective.
Indeed, the application of RO theory to JVs has led to numerous insights and
an improved understanding of collaborative ventures. Still, there remain a
number of promising opportunities for future research on JVs from an RO
perspective, and several theoretical and empirical gaps and inconsistencies
exist. Therefore, our objective in this paper is to provide a comprehensive
synthesis and extension of the RO literature on JVs. Where relevant, we offer
new testable propositions. We aim to make contributions in three areas.
First, several theoretical perspectives besides RO theory can be used to
study JVs. In fact, cooperative ventures lend themselves to a particularly
broad range of explanatory perspectives, which sometimes lead to sharply
differing conclusions (Martin, Mitchell, & Swaminathan, 1994; Cuypers &
Martin, 2006a). Therefore, we revisit the most important related literatures
on JVs – including learning, transaction cost, bargaining models and agency
theory – and link them to the RO literature, with a view to elaborate on the
relationships between these theories.
Second, one of the most attractive features of RO theory is that it is a
dynamic perspective that can explain each of a JV’s stages, from formation
to subsequent adjustment and post-JV outcomes (sale, dissolution, etc.). To
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make the best of such a dynamic theory requires consistency in researching
sequential stages. Although various JV stages have been duly studied from
an RO perspective, there are differences in the scope and content of studies of
the various JV stages. Therefore, we compare the theoretical arguments
and explanatory variables used to explain different JV stages, to highlight
important research opportunities and offer predictions and suggestions
toward a better integration within the RO literature.
Finally, we address the behavioral aspects of making RO investments.
Recent developments, including some applications to the RO literature,
have not been fully incorporated into JV research. We examine these ideas
and discuss their implications for JV research.
EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT REAL OPTIONS IN JOINT
VENTURES
Shortly after the formalization of ﬁnancial option theory, scholars recognized
that ﬁnancial options logic could be applied to corporate investments (Myers,
1977). These options on nonﬁnancial assets have been labeled ‘‘real options’’
and can be seen as contingent investment commitments that secure future
decision rights (Trigeorgis, 1993).
The insights and techniques from ﬁnancial option theory have shown that
the traditional net present value (NPV) valuation approach does not fully
capture the value of an investment. The traditional NPV approach should be
expanded to take into account management’s ﬂexibility to adapt to unex-
pected developments (Trigeorgis, 1995). Such ﬂexibility is valuable because it
can limit investors’ downside losses to their initial investment, while pre-
serving the upside potential. Thus, the expanded NPV approach should in-
corporate both a passive NPV component and a dynamic option value
component (Pindyck, 1988):
Value of an investment ¼ ‘‘passive NPV’’ of expected cash flows
þ ‘‘dynamic real option’’ value
However, these two different value components usually have to be cap-
tured in different ways, requiring differently structured investments – in terms
of share of the total investment, absolute size of the investment, scope and
sequencing of the project, etc. (e.g., Reuer & Tong, 2007). For instance, with
regard to JV investments, capturing the passive NPV component requires
taking a larger percentage stake in the JV, holding its size constant, in order
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to capture as much of the cash ﬂow as possible; while capturing the dynamic
option component requires taking a smaller stake (Chi & McGuire, 1996),
which secures future decision rights while minimizing the initial sunk costs
(and therefore downside risk). Meanwhile, an option-like investment by
a ﬁrm to seek new technology (without partner) corresponds with a
smaller (absolute) investment while an investment to capture the NPV
component corresponds with a larger (absolute) investment (Hurry, Miller, &
Bowman, 1992).
Among the ﬁrst to apply RO theory to JVs, Kogut (1991) argued that
ﬁrms can use a JV to capture the upside potential of an investment by buying
out the partner in a later stage when favorable information becomes avail-
able, while limiting their exposure to the initial investment. This option to
acquire can be explicit, but this is not a necessity.3 It remains possible, when
there is no ex ante contractual speciﬁcation of the strike price, or of the party
holding the acquisition right, for the parties involved to negotiate the ac-
quisition and sale of their share at a later stage. Therefore, a JV has at least
an embedded implicit call option4, i.e., an option to acquire a partner’s stake
(Chi & McGuire, 1996; Chi, 2000). Furthermore, Chi and McGuire (1996)
and Chi (2000) argued that the presence of an explicit option clause will
depend on three conditions: (1) the level of uncertainty,5 (2) the anticipation
of a change in the relative bargaining power of the two parties during their
collaboration, and (3) ex ante asymmetry between both parties in their
expected payoffs of the option. Only the ﬁrst determinant has received
empirical attention. Reuer and Tong (2005) studied empirically the deter-
minants of having an explicit option to acquire additional equity in a JV
making use of transaction costs theory and RO theory arguments. They
found that the likelihood that a ﬁrm has an explicit call option to acquire
equity in an IJV is a function of property rights, political, and diversiﬁcation-
related uncertainty, but not of cultural distance between partners’ home
countries – though only a very small proportion of JV listed in their sample,
drawn from the SDC database, had explicit options (1% in general, and 4%
of minority holdings). Altogether, there is some support for the premise that
JVs serve as ROs (Kogut, 1991; Chi & McGuire, 1996; Reuer, 2000, 2002;
Reuer & Leiblein, 2000) – albeit mostly implicit ROs. Further research in this
area is thus warranted.
Researchers have also examined the governance implications of implicit
and explicit ROs. Chi (2000) and Reuer and Tong (2005) argued that explicit
call options in JVs are one of several contractual safeguards that can be used
to reduce transaction costs. More speciﬁcally, Reuer and Tong (2005) argued
that an explicit call option enables a ﬁrm to take control of a JV when it
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observes that its partner is cheating (for instance, misappropriating knowl-
edge), or alternatively that the presence of an explicit call option might
reduce the chance of such opportunistic behavior. However, Chi and Seth
(2002) and Seth and Chi (2005) argued that the presence of an explicit call
option may weaken the other party’s incentive to contribute to the JV
beyond the value of the strike price of the option, as all value resulting from
these additional contributions will be captured by the call option holder. Put
together, these arguments suggest important questions for future research.
Would monitoring the other party in a JV with an explicit call option clause,
in order to know when to strike the option and take control of the venture,
be subject to greater or lesser costs and constraints than without an explicit
option clause – and under what conditions? More generally, how would
negotiation and monitoring costs compare, considering the stages identiﬁed
above – from initial JV setup to potential renegotiation to option exercise or
other JV conclusion? Before turning to the later stages, we examine another
critical initial decision regarding JVs as ROs – namely, the initial distribution
of equity shares among JV partners.
THE INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF EQUITY AMONG
JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS
Real Option Theory
Several scholars have examined the initial formation of JVs from an RO
perspective (e.g., Chi & McGuire, 1996; Folta, 1998). One key ﬁnding is that
the options embedded in JVs will have an impact on the distribution of the
equity stakes. On the one hand, an investor who tries to capture the static
NPV part will take an as large as possible share in the JV, to fully capture
the JV’s future cash ﬂows. In the extreme, this will lead to an acquisition
instead of a JV (Seth & Kim, 2001). On the other hand, an investor who
aims to capture the dynamic RO part will invest in a smaller share of the JV
because this way (s)he limits the downside risk while preserving the oppor-
tunity to capture the upside potential (Chi & McGuire, 1996; Reuer, 2002).
The value of the dynamic option part is a function of the same ﬁve factors
that determine the value of ﬁnancial options, i.e., the value of the underlying
asset, the strike price, the time to maturity, the risk-free rate and the un-
certainty surrounding the underlying asset (Seth & Kim, 2001). Of these,
uncertainty has been by far the most prominent throughout the RO
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literature on JVs, because of its natural appeal to strategy and international
business scholars.
Chi and McGuire (1996) argued that the value of the options embedded in
JVs is positively related to market, partner-related, and legal uncertainty.
Hence, higher levels of uncertainty in general, and these three forms of un-
certainty in particular, should lead to investors taking a smaller share in JVs.
Using a sample in the biotechnology industry, Folta (1998) studied the trade-
off between administrative control and commitment. He found that uncer-
tainty about the partner, exogenous technological uncertainty, and competi-
tive uncertainty all inﬂuence the likelihood of choosing a collaborative
venture over an acquisition. However, when a distinction was made between
two types of collaborative ventures – minority investments and JVs – the
results showed that only exogenous technological uncertainty encouraged the
formation of JVs as call options (rather than acquisitions). Multiple forms of
uncertainty were associated with taking RO positions in the form of minority
equity investments (rather than acquisitions).
In order to explain the apparent inconsistencies found in past research (e.g.,
Folta, 1998; Reuer & Leiblein, 2000), Cuypers and Martin (2006b, 2006c)
sought to reﬁne and expand conceptually and empirically the boundaries of
RO theory, with application to the ownership distribution of JVs. They built
on the distinction between forms of uncertainty that resolve endogenously
and exogenously (Roberts & Weitzman, 1981): Exogenous uncertainty is un-
certainty of which the resolution is unaffected by the actions of the ﬁrm, while
endogenous uncertainty is resolved (at least partially) by the actions of the
ﬁrm itself over time.6 Cuypers and Martin (2006b, 2006c) theorized that only
exogenous uncertainty would have the impact suggested by RO theory. The
case of exogenous uncertainty corresponds to models of ﬁnancial options,
where it is assumed that uncertainty is resolved independently of the inves-
tor’s behavior. Moreover, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) argue that exogenous
uncertainty increases the value of waiting for new information and makes
committing resources early less attractive, because investing will not inﬂuence
how uncertainty is resolved. Hence, RO models should be applicable.
However, when uncertainty resolves endogenously, RO logic is subject
to three objections. First, because investors are no longer price-takers,
conventional option valuation models break down. Second, ﬁrms will have
an incentive to invest and commit resources rather than wait (Dixit &
Pindyck, 1994). Third, the ﬂexibility of targets renders RO theory prob-
lematic as a decision-making template (Adner & Levinthal, 2004). For these
reasons, RO predictions will not accurately describe ﬁrms’ responses to
endogenous uncertainty.
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Using a sample of 6,472 Sino-foreign JVs established between 1979 and
1996, Cuypers and Martin (2006b, 2006c) found, as predicted by RO theory,
a negative relationship between the initial equity share taken by the foreign
partner and three sources of exogenous uncertainty: economic conditions,
local institutions, and exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Conversely, they found
no such relationship for three sources of endogenous uncertainty: cultural
uncertainty, uncertainty resulting from the scope of JV operations, and
technical uncertainty associated with product development activities.
Indeed, null hypothesis tests showed that these endogenous sources of un-
certainty have no signiﬁcant effect on the distribution of equity shares
among partners. In summary, Cuypers and Martin (2006b, 2006c) theorized
and showed empirically that initial alliance governance decisions, as evi-
denced by initial equity stakes in IJVs, conform to RO predictions when
uncertainty is exogenous but not when uncertainty is endogenous. Further-
more, they provided a ﬁrst empirical test, which is more consistent with
Chi and McGuire’s (1996) model by considering the entire range of the
ownership distribution rather than just the choice between collaborative
ventures and acquisitions, or minority and majority JVs.
Alternative Theories
A number of other theories have been used to study the initial formation of
JVs – for an overview of these, see Cuypers and Martin (2006a). This raises
the question of whether and how these theories contradict or complement
RO theory. Next, we brieﬂy discuss three alternative approaches that have
been used to examine governance decisions including the distribution of JV
equity shares.
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE)
Transactions are arrayed on a continuum between markets and hierarchy. On
this continuum, the optimal degree of integration (control) reﬂects the trade-
off between shirking costs that tend to arise when the parties are brought into
the same organization and cheating costs due to opportunism by arm’s length
parties (Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1993). In TCE, behavioral uncertainty
ﬁgures as an endogenous factor that can be addressed via governance
decisions. Furthermore, exogenous uncertainty acts in TCE theory as a
conditional factor: It exacerbates other characteristics of the transaction
(especially asset speciﬁcity) that increase ex ante and ex post costs of con-
tracting (e.g., Williamson, 1985; Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace, 2002; Lu &
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He´bert, 2005).7 However, few TCE studies have examined JV equity shares.
Furthermore, these studies have yielded mixed results regarding uncertainty –
especially regarding exogenous uncertainty.
Gatignon and Anderson (1988) studied the choice between full ownership
and shared ownership, and the ownership level in case of shared ownership.
They argued that higher levels of control, through equity ownership, are
preferred in case of higher asset speciﬁcity – especially in combination with
external (exogenous) uncertainty. Although R&D intensity, advertising in-
tensity, and marketing asset speciﬁcity, were indeed all associated with a
preference for full ownership, the interactions between them and external
uncertainty were insigniﬁcant. Furthermore, Gatignon and Anderson (1988)
were generally unsuccessful in explaining intermediate levels of ownership
when ownership is shared. Similarly, Chen, Hu, and Hu (2002) failed to ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant relationship between R&D and advertising intensities, respectively,
and intermediate levels of ownership.
Delios and Beamish (1999) focused mainly on the nature of the resources
that the foreign ﬁrm contributes to the IJV and argued that as asset
speciﬁcity increases, the foreign ﬁrm will take a higher equity position in
order to reduce the increased hazards of opportunistic behavior by the other
party. However, their results suggest ambiguous effects of transactional
characteristics on the ownership distribution of IJVs.
Bargaining Perspective
The ownership distribution of a JV is the outcome of negotiations in which
relative power is a deciding factor (Fagre & Wells, 1982). Generally, it is
assumed that partners prefer full ownership to gain more control and greater
payoffs from the venture. Subsequently, the relative bargaining power be-
tween both parties explains deviations from full ownership. However, the
preferred ownership structure predicted by other theories could also serve as
a starting point and the bargaining power of the venture’s parties can then be
used to explain deviations from the starting point (Blodgett, 1991).
A wide range of factors seem to inﬂuence bargaining power, and thereby
the equity distribution (Kobrin, 1987). Fagre and Wells (1982) found a part-
ner’s level of ownership to be positively related to its advertising intensity, its
provision of market access, and the amount of technology that it contributes;
and negatively related to its number of competitors. Blodgett (1991) found
that partners who contribute technology tend to have a higher initial share in
the JV, in particular when the other party only contributes local knowledge
and marketing resources. Furthermore, government restrictions may limit the
bargaining power of the foreign party by restricting the range of ownership it
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can bargain for (Blodgett, 1991). However, the exogeneity of uncertainty-
causing factors such a government regulation is not addressed in the
bargaining perspective, which tends to focus on ﬁrm-level determinants of
bargaining power.8 In general, bargaining power seems to be negatively
related to the need for complementary assets from the other party, and
positively related to the contribution the ﬁrm makes to the JV.
Agency Theory
The ownership structure of companies inﬂuences agency costs, i.e., those
inefﬁciencies resulting from the differing objectives of separate parties
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Foreign partners depend on the effort of the
local partner to make the JV succeed. However, the local partner only has
an incentive to put effort into the JV to the extent that it receives beneﬁts for
its contribution. These beneﬁts, in turn, are proportionate to the ownership
share that the local partner holds since the distribution of proﬁts of the JV is
typically based on the ownership distribution of the JV. Hence, the local
partner’s effort will depend on the share in the JV it owns. The foreign
partner can reduce the resulting agency costs by taking a smaller share in the
venture (Nakamura & Yeung, 1994). Therefore, uncertainty about the
behavior of the other party in the JV is endogenous. However, the foreign
partner also has to avoid spillovers to potential competitors, in particular of
intangible assets, by protecting the property rights of its resources.
Nakamura and Yeung (1994) argued that the likelihood of such spillovers
decreases less than proportionally as the foreign partner’s share in the JV
increases. Using data on technology-based US subsidiaries in Japan, they
found, as predicted, that JV ownership share is determined by a combina-
tion of spillover and agency considerations. Furthermore, they reported
ownership differences across different industries, which they attributed to
differences in the level of reliance on intangible assets – which is endogenous
– rather than an exogenous industry condition.
Chi and Roehl (1997) distinguished between ownership level and control in
JVs. More speciﬁcally, they argued that cheating cost could be reduced by
means of more control – measured by the number of key managerial
positions held in the venture. Shirking costs, on the other hand, can be
reduced by giving away more of the venture’s payoff – measured by the level
of equity ownership. Such shirking costs depend on how important and
measurable a party’s effort is to the overall success of the venture. Chi and
Roehl (1997) found positive relationships between the amount of discre-
tionary training provided by the foreign partner, the proportion of JV output
distributed by the foreign partner, and the dissimilarity between the local and
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foreign partner, respectively, and the foreign partner’s equity share. This
indicates that the initial ownership distribution serves to align incentives
when one party’s expected contribution is important to the overall perform-
ance of the venture yet is hard to measure, rather than to increase control
and thereby reduce the costs of making speciﬁc investments. Thus, Chi and
Roehl (1997) described how sources of endogenous uncertainty affect equity
shares. It is noteworthy that these sources of uncertainty can be controlled by
the partners. However, this research did not address exogenous uncertainty.
Conclusion
Several theoretical perspectives besides RO theory can be used to study the
formation of JVs (see Table 1). Furthermore, based on the above discussion,
we can identify areas of overlap and complementarity with these perspec-
tives. First, TCE and agency theory focus primarily on behavioral uncer-
tainty, which is endogenous. These theories have contributed to the analysis
of endogenous uncertainty as it affects JV equity share. However, they have
not yielded strong generalizable results regarding exogenous uncertainty.
This may be because, in TCE theory, exogenous environmental uncertainty
is of interest not as a direct effect but as an interactive effect (and likewise,
more implicitly, in agency theory). With respect to exogenous uncertainty,
which we know to inﬂuence equity shares too, RO theory has proven itself
to be a most promising starting point (Folta, 1998; Cuypers & Martin,
2006b). Thus, theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence in the lit-
erature dedicated to each theory suggest that TCE and agency theory hold
promise as complements to RO theory, with RO theory shedding light on
exogenous uncertainty (Cuypers & Martin, 2006b, 2006c), while the other
theories shed light on endogenous uncertainty (Cuypers & Martin, 2006a).9
Second, studies from a bargaining perspective have provided limited in-
sight into exogenous uncertainty. Still, this perspective may complement RO
theory, as follows: The exercise of bargaining power might explain some
deviations in initial equity shares relative to what RO theory would indicate.
Given that no empirical study has touched upon this, it remains unclear
whether or not, and in which direction, relative bargaining power can ac-
tually explain deviations from the initial ownership distribution predicted by
RO theory. This too represents an opportunity for future research.
In this section, we have highlighted the need for – and rewards from – a
more precise conceptualization of uncertainty when studying the initial dis-
tribution of equity among JV partners. There is a fundamental difference
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Table 1. The Initial Distribution of Equity among Joint Venture Partners: A Comparison of Perspectives.
Theory/Approach Unit of Analysis Focus (Goal
Assumed)
Predicted Effects on Initial Equity Share
Taken by the Focal (Foreign) Partner
Selected Studiesa
Exogenous
uncertainty
Endogenous uncertainty
Real option
theory
Option, i.e., an
investment
sequence
Investment value
maximization
via downside
risk
minimization
Direct effect,
negative
No effect Chi and McGuire
(1996), Cuypers and
Martin (2006a, 2006b,
2006c), Folta (1998)
Transaction cost
economics
Transaction Transaction cost
minimization
Conditional effect
(positive
moderation)
Direct or conditional
(positive moderation)
effect
Chen et al. (2002),
Delios and Beamish
(1999), Gatignon and
Anderson (1988)
Bargaining
perspective
Firm dyad (or
ﬁrm-
government
dyad)
Maximization of
the share of
beneﬁts (relative
to the partner)
Mostly ignored Bargaining power,
obtained via control
over resources and
uncertainty, is
positively associated
with initial ownership
share.
Blodgett (1991), Fagre
and Wells (1982),
Kobrin (1987)
Agency theory Principal and
agent
Agency costs
minimization
and effort
maximization
Mostly ignored Direct effect, depending
on shirking vs.
spillover or cheating
costs
Chi and Roehl (1997),
Nakamura and Yeung
(1994)
aAll studies listed in the table are discussed in the text above.
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between endogenous uncertainty and exogenous uncertainty. This calls for a
more explicit and elaborate argumentation as to what theory, or combina-
tion of theories, is suitable given the sources of uncertainty on hand. TCE
and agency theory hold promise as complements to RO theory. Further-
more, the bargaining perspective may be useful to explain some deviations
from normative RO models. Many of these insights, starting with the im-
portance of conceptualizing uncertainty carefully, also stand to be relevant
in studying later JV stages from an RO perspective. Given this, we turn next
to the stability and change in JVs following their formation.
THE STABILITY AND EVOLUTION OF JOINT
VENTURES
Real Option Theory
Another aspect of JVs that has received attention from an RO perspective is
the stability of JVs after their formation. JV instability – or more generally
evolution – can refer to a number of different outcomes: joint or unilateral
dissolution, termination of the JV, a partial change in ownership, a full
buyout of one partner by the other, or (in rare cases) a (partial) sale to a
third party. Each outcome may have different causes, as described below,
but in all cases there is a change in the ownership and/or activity of the JV,
which indicates a change in option terms and/or an exercise of the option.
According to RO theory, the holder of a (call) option will hold onto the
option either until it expires, meaning that the joint activity ceases; or until a
positive signal occurs, i.e., the value of the underlying asset exceeds the
strike price at which the ﬁrm can increase its equity share. This discrete
investment logic distinguishes an RO investment from other path-dependent
and incremental investment processes (Adner & Levinthal, 2004).
Kogut (1991) examined the effect of demand uncertainty on the timing of
the exercise of call options, when one JV partner buys out the other. Using a
sample of 92 manufacturing JVs, he found that the timing of exercising the
option is determined by positive product market signals, while negative
signals do not affect the stability of the JV. This asymmetry in the effects of
positive and negative signals, combined with the discrete nature of changes
in ownership structure, is a deﬁning characteristic of JVs as ROs.
Similarly, Miller and Folta (2002) and Folta and Miller (2002) studied the
timing decision to exercise ROs. Miller and Folta (2002) argued that the
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optimal time to exercise real call options depends on six factors: (1) the
current dividends, (2) the exercise price, (3) the residual resource value, (4)
the discount rate, (5) the call option value, and (6) the nature of the option
(compound vs. simple). In turn, they argued that most of these six factors
are determined by a number of other factors.10
Folta and Miller (2002) examined empirically the timing decision to strike
real call options embedded in biotechnology equity partnerships, by looking
at the acquisition of additional equity by one party. They found that the value
of the underlying asset and the number of parties in the JV increase, while the
level of technological uncertainty decreases, the likelihood that an option is
exercised. Furthermore, they looked at interaction effects and found that the
effect of the value of the underlying asset, and the effect of the number of
parties on the timing of striking the option, both differ under different levels
of technological uncertainty. They also found some evidence, albeit weak,
that the presence of an explicit option decreases the likelihood that options
are struck. This result contradicted Miller and Folta’s (2002) prediction.
Finally, Vassolo, Anand, and Folta (2004) studied empirically both the
abandonment decision and the striking of options in collaborative ventures
in the biotech industry. Consistent with RO theory, they found a negative
relationship between industry uncertainty and the technological distance be-
tween the focal alliance and the parent’s portfolio of other alliances, respec-
tively, and the likelihood of the alliance being divested. Additionally, Vassolo
et al. (2004) found evidence of a negative relationship between the techno-
logical distance between the ﬁrm and the focal alliance, and the likelihood of
striking the option. However, they failed to ﬁnd any such relationship for
technological uncertainty. Like Folta and Miller (2002), they found that
explicit option agreements decrease the likelihood of buyouts and divestures.
Alternative Theories
A number of other approaches have been used to explain alliance evolution
and instability (Gulati, 1998). Most prominent among them are transaction
cost economics, the bargaining perspective (power dependence), and organ-
izational learning and experience (Martin et al., 1994).11 In addition, there
are large differences across and within these approaches in the way instability
is deﬁned or operationalized. These different operationalizations of instabi-
lity each correspond to different outcomes from an RO perspective. On the
one hand, several studies focused on JV termination as JV instability (e.g.,
Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997), which from an RO perspective, corresponds
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with letting options expire. On the other hand, some scholars studied partial
or full buyouts (e.g., Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993), which from an RO
perspective correspond with striking the option. Furthermore, some studies
did not distinguish between both outcomes (e.g., Blodgett, 1992). We will
now brieﬂy discuss the theoretical approaches and ﬁndings most predomi-
nant in the literature: transaction cost economics, the bargaining perspective,
and learning theory.
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE)
Although TCE is sometimes held to be a static theory that focuses on
ex ante governance decisions, Williamson (1991) argued that TCE can be
the basis of a comparative analysis that explains the adaptation of govern-
ance structures – and speciﬁcally JVs – to changing circumstances. Follow-
ing this line of reasoning, some studies have examined the postformation
dynamics of JVs from a TCE perspective. Lu and He´bert (2005) argued that
the survival of a JV depends on the ﬁt between the initial conditions, i.e., the
characteristics of the transaction and the environment, and the chosen gov-
ernance structure at the formation of the JV. They found that higher levels
of control in IJVs in the presence of high asset speciﬁcity (i.e., ﬁt between
governance arrangement and transaction conditions) lead to higher IJV
survival rates. Reuer and Arin˜o (2002) also studied the impact of the initial
conditions of JVs on their stability, as measured by the absence or presence
of a contractual renegotiation. They argued and found that the willingness
or the ability to change the governance of alliances increases with the level of
governance misﬁt and asset speciﬁcity while it decreases when there are
more contractual safeguards. Furthermore, they examined whether or not
changes in the environment affect the decision to renegotiate. They did not
ﬁnd any effect of changes in the environment on this form of JV stability.
Bargaining Perspective
Earlier studies, which linked the internal structure of JVs to their stability,
argued that ventures with a dominant partner were more stable. Absolute
control makes it easier to make decisions and the potential for conﬂict will be
reduced (Killing, 1983). However, subsequent research argued and found
empirical evidence that a more equal ownership division will result in more
stable JVs (e.g., Beamish & Banks, 1987; Blodgett, 1992; Hennart & Zeng,
2002). As discussed above in the section covering the formation of JVs, this
stream of research sees the ownership of a JV as the result of the relative
bargaining power of the partners in the negotiation process. Balanced own-
ership indicates partners with equal bargaining power and equal contributions
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to the JV, which pushes both partners to make accommodations that enhance
stability. Conversely, an unequal ownership division implies that one partner
has made a larger contribution to the venture and has more bargaining power
than the other party, which it can use to dictate terms, leading to more
negotiations and changes (Blodgett, 1992).
Some studies have taken a more dynamic perspective by focusing on shifts
in bargaining power (e.g., Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). Such shifts can be the
consequence of learning or changes in the environment (Hamel, 1991).
Hamel (1991) and Inkpen and Beamish (1997) argued that learning is the
more important determinant of changes in relative bargaining power and JV
instability. Hence, there is an overlap between this dynamic bargaining per-
spective and the view of JVs as learning races (which we discuss below) in
that as knowledge is acquired from the partner, the dependence of one party
on the other is reduced and the likelihood that the JV is terminated increases.
Yan and Gray (1994) found that changes in the environment, such as policy
changes introduced by local governments, also lead to changes in relative
bargaining power between the partners and thereby trigger changes in the
structure of the venture.
Learning Theory
Kogut (1988) argued that JVs are vehicles to learn and transfer knowledge.
Subsequently, learning from past collaborative ventures and learning within
collaborative ventures will have an impact on their stability. The literature
includes studies that stipulate three very different learning purposes, and
thereby different links between learning and stability: learning about part-
nering, learning from the partner, and learning about the partner.
First, several studies have examined the effect of prior experience on the
survival of JVs. However, different scholars have put forward opposing
effects of prior experience on JV survival. On the one hand, several scholars
have argued that prior experience will lead to more stable JVs. For instance,
Barkema et al. (1996) and Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) found that the
cultural barriers associated with starting a venture abroad are reduced as a
result of learning from prior experiences abroad, which increases the survival
of foreign collaborative ventures. Furthermore, Pangarkar (2003) argued and
found evidence that collaborative ventures will last longer if both partners
have prior experience because ﬁrms learn to manage alliances and generate
synergies through the pooling of resources. On the other hand, some re-
searchers have argued that prior experience would lead to more unstable JVs.
Blodgett (1992) found that prior experience in the renegotiation of ownership
terms would lead to more unstable JVs because partners learn to make similar
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changes in the future. Reuer, Zollo, and Singh (2002) integrated these two
opposing effects on the stability of JVs. They argued that experienced ﬁrms
should be able to design the JVs more effectively ex ante, which increases JV
stability; while prior experience also creates a capability to effectively modify
the alliance’s governance structure, which decreases JV stability. By discrimi-
nating between different types of experiences in which different effects dom-
inate, they found support for their arguments. The corresponding form of
instability is a change in the terms and equity shares in the JV.
Second, a few studies have examined the competitive learning dynamics of
partners within JVs. Firms may enter into a JV with the aim of learning
and internalizing the skills of its partner. In that case, collaborative ventures
can be seen as a transitional device in which partners race or compete to
learn and acquire each other’s resources, competencies and skills. As soon
as one partner has achieved its goal, the race is over and the JV will be
terminated (Hamel, 1991). Thus, the timing of the termination of the JV will
be a function of the pace of learning, which is endogenous to the partners’
actions according to Hamel (1991). Furthermore, the termination of JVs
will be the likely outcome observed, and such termination represents a suc-
cess for at least one partner from this perspective. However, the prevalence
of such strategies is in question. Hennart, Roehl, and Zietlow (1999) failed
to ﬁnd support for the associated prediction that ﬁrms speciﬁcally the
Japanese ﬁrms discussed by Hamel (1991) – use JVs as temporary ‘‘Trojan
horses’’ at the expense of their partners. Because of the importance of
relation-speciﬁc skills and routines, stability in interﬁrm cooperation is in
fact normally a precondition both for partner expansion and for knowledge
sharing among partners, and these in turn reinforce the stability of inter-
ﬁrm relations (Martin, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998; Kotabe, Martin, &
Domoto, 2003).
Third, making use of learning and information economics arguments,
Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) argued that JVs could act as intermediate
forms that enable ﬁrms to learn about possible takeover targets. A ﬁrm can
use the JV as a means to collect information about the quality of its partner.
Subsequently, if the partner turns out to be of bad quality the JV will be
terminated. Conversely, if the partner turns out to be of good quality an
acquisition will take place. Several subsequent studies have argued or found
empirically that JVs can mitigate the effect of information asymmetry about
a potential acquisition target (Reuer & Koza, 2000; Shen & Reuer, 2005).
Thus, the corresponding form of JV instability is the effective buyout by one
partner as it acquires the other partner, and suggests potential success for
both partners.
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Conclusion
In this section, we compared the literature used to explain the evolution and
stability of JVs (see Table 2). The TCE literature on JV stability is still small
and has mainly focused on how the degree of ﬁt between the initial conditions
and the governance choice at the formation stage inﬂuences subsequent
stability. Nevertheless, TCE holds promise to shed light on endogenous
uncertainty too. As we have described earlier, environmental uncertainty has
an interactive effect from a TCE perspective (Williamson, 1985). Namely, a
change in environmental conditions will not have much of an impact unless
some other characteristics of the transaction, such as a high level of asset
speciﬁcity, make this change problematic. Meanwhile, RO theory points to
the existence of an explicit option, depending on uncertainty, as factors
affecting JV stability. Thus, TCE and RO theory do not contradict each
other. However, the interaction effect between environmental changes and
asset speciﬁcity has not been tested empirically in the context of JV stability.
Furthermore, it would imply a realignment of ownership shares. From an RO
perspective, however, equity stakes adjust asymmetrically – speciﬁcally, the
holder of a call option will increase her share only if changes in the envi-
ronment push the option ‘‘in the money’’, i.e., if the value of the partner’s
underlying equity share has improved beyond the threshold strike price.
Therefore, we propose:
Proposition 1a. Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of JV instability will increase
when there is a change in the environment and there is high asset speciﬁcity.
Proposition 1b. Ceteris paribus, in the presence of an explicit call option,
this effect will be stronger on the likelihood of a (partial) buyout (as opposed
to termination), but only if the change in the environment pushes the JV
share’s value beyond the strike price.
The bargaining perspective has been used to predict both the initial dis-
tribution and subsequent changes in bargaining power. On the one hand, the
studies looking at the initial bargaining power distribution argued that more
unbalanced bargaining power, which translates in a more unequal equity
division, will result in more unstable JVs. However, RO theory offers an
alternative explanation for this prediction. Namely, taking an RO position
will correspond to taking a smaller share in a JV with the intention to
change this equity position at a later stage. Thus, a more imbalanced equity
position might lead to JV instability from an RO perspective because it
corresponds with one party taking an option. Furthermore, in the case of an
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Table 2. The Stability of Joint Ventures: A Comparison of Perspectives.
Theory/
Approach
Unit of Analysis Focus (Goal
Assumed)
Predicted Effects on JV Stability Selected Studiesa
Exogenous uncertainty
and change
Endogenous
uncertainty and
change
Real option
theory
Option, i.e., an
investment
sequence
Maximize return by
increasing
investment under
positive ex post
conditions but
not under
negative ex post
conditions
Changes in value have
direct asymmetric
effects: buy out
partner if option is
in the money; else
hold on to the
option, or terminate
the option (divest) if
an option-based
divestment threshold
has been reached
No effect Kogut (1991), Folta
and Miller (2002),
Miller and Folta
(2002), Vassolo et al.
(2004)
Exogenous changes
also determine the
timing of option
exercise
Transaction cost
economics
Transaction Minimize the misﬁt
between the
governance
arrangement and
the transaction
conditions
Conditional effect
(close or renegotiate
JV in case of misﬁt)
Direct and/or
conditional effect
(close or renegotiate
JV in case of misﬁt)
Lu and He´bert (2005),
Reuer and Arin˜o
(2002)
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Bargaining
perspective
Firm dyad (or ﬁrm-
government
dyad)
As power is gained
or lost, exert it
accordingly to
maximize share
of beneﬁts from
the JV (relative to
the partner)
Changes in power have
direct symmetric
effects (the effect of
a gain in power is
the reverse of the
effect of a loss of
power)
Changes in power have
direct symmetric
effects (the effect of
a gain in power is
the reverse of the
effect of a loss of
power)
Blodgett (1992),
Inkpen and
Beamish (1997), Yan
and Gray (1994)
Learning theory Partners Use learning to
enhance the
performance of
the JV or the
returns from the
JV to the parent
No effect Direct effects: Barkema, Bell, and
Pennings (1996),
Hamel (1991),
Pangarkar (2003),
Reuer and Koza
(2000), Reuer et al.
(2002), Shen and
Reuer (2005)
Learning about
allying affects JV
survival and
renegotiation
Learning from
partner affects JV
continuation
Learning about
partner affects
partner
acquisition
aAll studies listed in the table are discussed in the text above.
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option, the timing and conditions for a change in equity shares should
correspond to speciﬁc changes in business conditions whereby the option
becomes ‘‘in the money.’’
On the other hand, several studies argued that shifts in bargaining power
would result in JV instability. Furthermore, the emphasis in these studies is on
internal and endogenous factors, such as learning, which inﬂuence bargaining
power. Chi and McGuire (1996) and Chi (2000) suggested that this bargaining
power argument and RO theory might be complementary. Speciﬁcally, they
argued that bargaining power would affect the value distribution between the
parties in a changing JV, in case a strike price has to be negotiated when there
is no explicit call option. Consequently, the parties in a JV would anticipate
shifts in bargaining power and react by negotiating for an explicit option
clause. Accordingly, the following proposition can be tested:12
Proposition 2a. Ceteris paribus, the likelihood that a ﬁrm has an explicit
call option will be higher when it expects its bargaining power to dete-
riorate during the life of the JV.
However, when there is no explicit option in place we would expect the
option holder to anticipate a loss in bargaining power by striking the option
when (s)he still has a more favorable level of relative bargaining power. This
way, the option holder is able to capture more value than after the shift in
bargaining power. Hence, we expect the following effect of shifts in bar-
gaining power on the timing of exercising the option:
Proposition 2b. Ceteris paribus, the likelihood that the holder of an im-
plicit call option will increase its share or buy out its JV partner is higher
when the holder expects that its bargaining power will deteriorate, while
such a relationship will not hold when the option holder has an explicit
option clause.
Although external factors have received less attention from a bargaining
perspective, they may also play a signiﬁcant role in explaining shifts in
bargaining power and subsequent JV instability. Similarly, RO theory pre-
dicts that favorable changes in the environment results in option holders
exercising their options. Thus, both the bargaining perspective and RO
theory seem to offer similar predictions for favorable changes in the envi-
ronment. However, RO theory predicts that JVs will remain stable when the
changes in the environment are unfavorable until the expiry date of the
option. Thus, the predictions of both views differ when it comes to changes
that have a negative impact.
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Beside the learning race view of JVs, the learning perspective has focused
on prior experience. On the one hand, prior experience is expected to in-
ﬂuence the ability to design alliances ex ante and the ability to restructure
the alliance ex post, and thereby inﬂuence JV stability. However, this view
only focuses on ability and not on the external factors that would trigger the
need for ex post adjustments. Hence, this part of the learning literature on
alliances does not seem to contradict or overlap with RO theory. Some
studies have also explored how learning can reduce uncertainty during the
life of JVs. These studies hold promise as complements to RO theory, with
RO theory shedding light on the effect of changes in exogenous uncertainty
(Cuypers & Martin, 2006c) while learning models focus on the impact of
changes in endogenous uncertainty on JV stability.
Overall, the key feature of ROs, which distinguishes RO theory from the
other theories described above, is the asymmetry in the expected effect of a
negative and positive signal from the environment. Instability in the sense of
one partner buying out at least a part of the other’s share, will only occur
after a positive signal is observed, while JVs are expected to remain stable
when a negative signal is observed until the option expires. This property of
ROs should be exploited, as done by Kogut (1991), to distinguish empir-
ically between RO explanations and alternative explanations such as the
bargaining perspective and learning theory. Furthermore, we showed how
the bargaining perspective could contribute to our understanding of the
timing of exercising options, and vice versa. Namely, changes in relative
bargaining power due to asymmetric learning are likely to be a key deter-
minant of the timing decision to strike options when no explicit option
clause is present, but this effect will depend on the existence of an explicit
option as well as the direction of changes in environmental conditions.
PERFORMANCE
There exist a variety of ways to assess performance in the JV literature
(Anderson, 1990; Olk, 2002). First, there are a number of alternative levels of
analysis. The performance of the JV itself can be analyzed, or that of one
speciﬁc parent, or the combined performance of all parents. Second, per-
formance can be measured via several scales such as subjective evaluation and
satisfaction, ﬁnancial performance, or JV (or parent) survival. Third, per-
formance can be measured at different points in time, and over different time
horizons. For instance, regarding ﬁnancial performance, abnormal returns
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from event studies capture all performance implications of an investment as
they can be anticipated in a near-instantaneous measurement window, while
accounting measures such as ROA capture performance as it unfolds during
the selected years. Likewise, there exist a broad range of measures of per-
formance in the RO literature, as reviewed by Reuer and Tong (2007).
Most RO studies at least implicitly assume that investment decisions made
in accordance with RO predictions will lead to value creation and higher
ﬁnancial performance (Kumar, 2005). However, studies testing this assump-
tion are few, particularly pertaining to JVs. Kumar (2005) provided insights
into the conditions under which acquiring a venture – i.e., striking a call
option – or divesting a venture enhances the value of the parent ﬁrms. Using
event study methodology, he found that JVs created value when they were
divested with the aim of refocusing the ﬁrm’s product market portfolio.
Furthermore, the results revealed a negative relationship between the value
created by both the acquirers and divesters, respectively, and the degree of
technological and demand uncertainty. A similar relationship was found
between the degree of rivalry in the target market and the value created by the
acquirer. Contrary to RO predictions, rivalry did not seem to inﬂuence the
value created by the divester. Furthermore, Kumar (2005) failed to ﬁnd pos-
itive abnormal returns when a partner acquired a JV with the aim of growth
and expansion in a target market, which would be predicted by RO theory.
Tong, Reuer, and Peng (2007) also examined under what conditions ﬁrms
capture growth option value from having JVs. Contrary to Kumar (2005)
who used abnormal returns to measure option value, Tong et al. (2007)
measured value creation at a more aggregate corporate level. Namely, they
partitioned the total value of the ﬁrm into a ‘‘value of assets in place’’ com-
ponent and a ‘‘growth option’’ component, as suggested by Myers (1977).
Their ﬁndings revealed a positive relationship between a ﬁrm’s number of JVs
and its growth option value. Furthermore, they found that the number of
minority JVs and the number of non-core JVs have a greater impact on
growth option value than the number of non-minority JVs and the number of
core JVs, respectively. This is consistent with JVs being valuable growth
options. However, they failed to ﬁnd that the number of JVs in developing
countries has a greater impact on growth option value than the number of
JVs in developed countries.
Finally, Reuer and Leiblein (2000) focused on the value that results from
using ROs to limit downside risk, rather than on the upside potential of
making RO investments. This is important as Kogut (1991) argued that
ﬁrms could use JVs to capture upside potential by buying out a partner
when favorable news becomes available, while limiting their downside risk.
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However, inconsistent with this RO prediction, Reuer and Leiblein (2000)
found that ﬁrms that enter into multiple JVs do not thereby reduce their
downside risk. In fact, for two out of three measures of downside risk, IJVs
were associated with increased risk.
In sum, although some of the above empirical ﬁndings offer support to
some RO arguments, they also point out some important deviations from
the predictions of the theory. Therefore, the performance implications of
making RO investments should receive additional attention. Speciﬁcally, the
conditions under which JVs indeed serve as growth options that enhance
ﬁrm value require attention. So do the conditions under which JVs do or do
not allow ﬁrms to avoid downside risk.
The conditions under which JVs serve as growth options can be studied by
combining elements of Kumar’s (2005) and Tong et al.’s (2007) approaches
and looking at the effect of divestments and buyouts on a ﬁrm’s growth
option value. The adjustment to a ﬁrm’s growth option value after a divest-
ment or buyout will depend on the conditions surrounding the JV, speciﬁcally
the level of exogenous uncertainty that enhances the growth option.
Accordingly, we propose:
Proposition 3a. Ceteris paribus, divesting a JV surrounded by higher lev-
els of exogenous uncertainty will lead to a higher reduction in a ﬁrm’s
growth option value than divesting a JV surrounded by lower levels of
exogenous uncertainty.
Proposition 3b. Ceteris paribus, buying out a JV surrounded by higher
levels of exogenous uncertainty will lead to a higher reduction in a ﬁrm’s
growth option value than buying out a JV surrounded by lower levels of
exogenous uncertainty.
INTEGRATING THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF JOINT
VENTURES
As we have discussed earlier, one of the attractive features of RO theory is
that it is a dynamic perspective that can explain each of a JV’s life-cycle stages
– from initial conditions, to JV terms and initial ownership, to formation, to
subsequent adjustment and post-JV outcomes (sale, dissolution, etc.). Ideally,
such a dynamic theory requires consistency in researching sequential stages.
However, some variables or relationships that have been studied at one par-
ticular stage of JVs have received far less attention (or none at all) in studies
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that examined other stages. In this section we aim to integrate the different JV
stages from an RO perspective. We discuss each of the stages and recap the
results and arguments stepwise. Based on this we develop implications and
propositions for researching each subsequent stage of the JV life cycle. We
start by discussing how uncertainty can predict outcomes of each of the JV’s
life-cycle stages and then we move through each of the later stages – explicit
vs. implicit options, initial equity shares, and ﬁnally stability and adjustments
– to see how each of them can explain the subsequent stages. Table 3 de-
scribes the arrangement of the resulting predictions.
Exogenous Uncertainty
One of the most prominent concepts in RO theory, uncertainty, stands to
inﬂuence each of the stages in the JV life cycle. As discussed above, Cuypers
and Martin (2006b, 2006c) theorized and found empirically that exogenous
uncertainty will affect the initial ownership distribution in JVs as predicted
by RO theory, but endogenous uncertainty will not. Studies looking at the
other stages in the JV life cycle have not explicitly contrasted the effects of
two or more sources of uncertainty, nor distinguished between forms of
uncertainty that resolve endogenously vs. exogenously. However, the the-
oretical arguments of Cuypers and Martin (2006b, 2006c) can be general-
ized. The distinction between exogenous and endogenous uncertainty stands
to matter not only to different forms of ROs (Roberts & Weitzman, 1981;
Adner & Levinthal, 2004), but also across stages of JVs as analyzed from an
RO perspective. Our arguments so far entail that RO logic can help explain
each of other stages of the JV life cycle when uncertainty resolves ex-
ogenously, but does not operate the same way when uncertainty resolves
endogenously. Accordingly, ﬁrst, we expect the presence of an explicit call
option to depend on the nature of uncertainty. Thus, we propose:
Proposition 4. Ceteris paribus, the likelihood that a ﬁrm has an explicit
option to acquire equity is positively related to the level of exogenous
uncertainty surrounding the JV. However, from a real option perspective,
we do not expect such a relationship for JVs surrounded by endogenous
uncertainty.
This does not preclude the possibility that from a transaction cost per-
spective, the likelihood of an explicit option increases with endogenous un-
certainty because of the governance properties of such an explicit option – as
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Table 3. Integrating Research on the Different Stages of Joint Ventures.
Independent Variables
Exogenous
uncertainty
Explicitness of call
options
Initial distribution
of equity among JV
partners
Stability of JVs
Dependent variables Explicitness of call
options
Proposition 4 – – –
Initial distribution of
Equity among JV
partners
Cuypers and Martin
(2006c)
Proposition 7 – –
Stability of JVs Proposition 5 Miller and Folta
(2002), Folta and
Miller (2002),
Vassolo et al. (2004)
Proposition 9 –
Performance Proposition 6 Propositions 8a and 8b Proposition 10 Proposition 11
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suggested by Reuer and Tong (2005). In this area, then, RO and transaction
cost theories are not fully reconciled.
Furthermore, we would expect the effect of the level of uncertainty on
the stability of JVs to be consistent with conventional RO predictions
when uncertainty resolves exogenously, but not when uncertainty resolves
endogenously:
Proposition 5. Ceteris paribus, a lower level of exogenous uncertainty will
increase the likelihood of a buyout by the call option holder. However,
from a real option perspective, we do not except such a relationship for
endogenous uncertainty.
Kumar (2005) found, as predicted, that a negative relationship exists be-
tween the value created by both the acquirers and divesters, respectively, and
the degree of technological and demand uncertainty. Although Kumar (2005)
considered these two distinct sources of uncertainty, he did not contrast
exogenous and endogenous sources of uncertainty. Following Cuypers and
Martin’s (2006b, 2006c) arguments, we expect performance implications to be
consistent with conventional RO predictions when uncertainty resolves
exogenously, but not when uncertainty resolves endogenously. Accordingly,
we propose:
Proposition 6. Ceteris paribus, from a real option perspective, the value
created for the acquirer and the divester when a JV is (partially) acquired
will be negatively associated with the degree of exogenous uncertainty.
However, from a real option perspective, we do not expect such a rela-
tionship for JVs surrounded by endogenous uncertainty.
Explicitness of Call Options
Having an explicit call option gives the option holder certainty over the price
it will have to pay when it decides to strike the option. Conversely, when a
ﬁrm does not have an explicit option contract, it will have to negotiate a price
when it wants to strike the option. There will be costs as a result of bar-
gaining, and the other party is likely to capture at least part of the value that
otherwise would have fully gone to the call option holder; however, in the
meanwhile, any disincentive to effort by the party not holding the explicit
option may be reduced (Chi & McGuire, 1996; Chi, 2000).
With respect to initial JV equity shares, this implies that having an explicit
call option clause ex ante will make the option more valuable relative to not
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having such a clause, because the option holder will be able to capture all
residual value (see also Reuer & Tong, 2005); while the option holder may
concede more initial ownership to the other party in order to obtain the call
option (Chi & McGuire, 1996). In this case, the two effects work in the same
direction, and an investor who takes an explicit RO position in a JV is likely
to have a smaller initial equity share. Hence, we expect:
Proposition 7. Ceteris paribus, if a ﬁrm holds an explicit call option, it will
take a smaller share in the JV than when it only has an implicit call option.
However, there is a complication in that the presence of an explicit option
clause seems to be determined by the same factor, i.e., exogenous uncer-
tainty, as the initial ownership distribution (Reuer & Tong, 2005). The
presence of an explicit option clause may also act as a mediator because
exogenous uncertainty inﬂuences the ownership distribution. Therefore, it
would be interesting to decompose the total effect of exogenous uncertainty
on ownership distribution into an indirect effect through the presence of an
explicit option and a direct effect, and evaluate which effect is more im-
portant. A similar effort would also prove insightful for other stages of the
JV life cycle as exogenous uncertainty inﬂuences each of them.
The RO literature on JV stability has already largely incorporated the
effects of explicit call option clauses. As discussed above, Miller and Folta
(2002) argued that an explicit option clause accelerates the timing of striking
options. Furthermore, Folta and Miller (2002) and Vassolo et al. (2004) con-
trolled for the presence of explicit option clauses. However, both studies found
that the presence of an explicit option clause decreases the likelihood of the
option holder striking the option. Thus, the empirical results contradict Miller
and Folta’s (2002) prediction. This indicates a need for further research.
With respect to the performance implications of striking an option, the
presence of an explicit call option is also relevant. As mentioned earlier, in
the presence of an explicit call option the option holder will capture all value
while in the absence of such a clause, the value is likely to be divided
between the acquirer and divester. Hence, we expect:
Proposition 8a. Ceteris paribus, if the acquirer of a JV share held an
explicit call option initially, the abnormal return for the acquiring party
will be positive while the abnormal return for the divesting party will not
differ from zero.
Proposition 8b. Ceteris paribus, if the acquirer holds only an implicit call
option, the abnormal returns for the acquiring and divesting parties will
both be positive.
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Initial Joint Venture Equity Shares
Investors who are aiming to make an option investment will take a
smaller share in the JV because the payoff of the option increases as the
stake of the investor in the JV decreases. Conversely, investors will take a
larger share if they aim to capture the static NPV part (Chi & McGuire,
1996). Thus, a different ownership stake will indicate a different type of
investment.
Regarding the stability of JVs, we would expect RO investments to be
associated with higher levels of instability than more static investments in
the NPV part. Given that both types of investments are associated with
taking different levels of equity in a JV, the equity distribution should be a
predictor of JV stability. Therefore, we propose the following, which to our
knowledge has not been tested in RO research:
Proposition 9. Ceteris paribus, the likelihood that a ﬁrm will (partially)
buy out its partner after receiving a positive signal will be higher when it
has a smaller initial stake in the JV.
The performance implications of having different levels of ownership have
not been studied empirically, although Chi and McGuire (1996) developed a
model whereby the payoff of striking the option increases as the initial stake
of the investor in the JV decreases, because the investor has a greater range
of additional in-the-money equity to invest in. Assuming that this relation-
ship holds, we would expect the following:
Proposition 10. Ceteris paribus, an acquirer that held a smaller share will
have a higher abnormal return when it (partially) buys out its partner.
Stability of Joint Ventures
Tong et al. (2007) found a positive relationship between a ﬁrm’s number of
JVs and its growth option value. However, they did not study the effects
of instability of the JVs in a ﬁrm’s option portfolio on the ﬁrm’s growth
option value. Any adjustment in the number of options, should lead to a
corresponding adjustment in growth option value. Three kinds of adjust-
ments can be made: (1) terminating a JV, (2) fully buying out a JV, or (3)
partially buying out a JV. All three should reduce the growth option value.
However, the latter case should reduce growth option value less as it does
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not fully abandon or strike the option as in the ﬁrst two scenarios because it
leaves the possibility to acquire an additional stake in the future. Accord-
ingly, we predict:
Proposition 11. Ceteris paribus, the termination of a JV, the full buyout of
a JV and the partial buyout all reduce the growth option value of a ﬁrm.
However, this reduction will be smaller in the case of a partial buyout.
Conclusion
In this section, we compared the literature used to explain the different
JV stages and discuss how each stage can predict outcomes at subsequent
stages (see Table 3). We contributed to the literature by identifying a
number of important research opportunities resulting from the current lack
of integration between these different stages. We offered a number of pre-
dictions and suggestions toward a better integration within the RO literature
on JVs.
Furthermore, the lack of integration between the different stages raises a
number of empirical issues. First, there are several potential sources of
omitted-variable bias when a determinant of one JV stage is ignored in
studying subsequent stages. For instance, exogenous uncertainty affects
both the ownership structure of JVs (Folta, 1998; Cuypers & Martin, 2006c)
and the stability of equity partnerships (Folta & Miller, 2002). Furthermore,
we have argued that the ownership structure will also have an effect on the
stability of JVs from an RO perspective. However, to the best of our
knowledge, none of the JV stability studies from an RO perspective has
controlled for the initial ownership distribution. By integrating the different
stages in the RO process, and based on the propositions in this section, we
aim to clearly indicate which factors should be controlled for in each of the
different stages.
Second, a possible endogenous-selection bias arises when the different
stages are not sufﬁciently integrated. Firms make RO investment choices
based on environment conditions. Hence, their investment decisions are self-
selected and endogenous (Shaver, 1998). However, studies of the performance
implications of RO investments do not incorporate several of the factors that
determine the initial RO investment choice. The conclusions drawn from
these studies might be incorrect or incompletely generalizable in the presence
of self-selection. We have discussed above how the conditions and decisions
leading to each successive JV stage (uncertainty, explicit vs. implicit options,
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initial equity shares, and subsequent stability) should be considered when
studying the performance implications of making RO investments. This
should help ensure that variable omission and self-selection do not invalidate
future research.
INTEGRATING BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS IN THE
REAL OPTION LITERATURE
Objective vs. Subjective Uncertainty
Several scholars have called to study the behavioral aspects of making
RO investments (e.g., Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994;
Li, James, Madhavan, & Mahoney, 2007). Responding to this call,
Miller and Shapira (2004) reported evidence of biases in decision makers’
estimations of the value of options. However, other than that paper,
studies of the behavioral aspects of making RO investments remain lack-
ing, particularly so when it comes to exploring JVs. Therefore, we aim
to contribute to the existing literature by making use of behavioral
decision theory to offer new insights on how managers perceive uncertainty
and ROs.
While uncertainty is one of the fundamental concepts in RO theory,
the way it is described in the literature does not necessarily correspond with
observed practice. RO theory has its roots in ﬁnance. Therefore, it is
generally (at least implicitly) assumed that investors are rational and able to
specify an accurate distribution of the expected returns of an investment
ex ante (Leiblein, 2003). Accordingly, uncertainty is usually conceptualized
and measured as being objective. However, in reality managers value options
based on their subjective perceptions of uncertainty (e.g., Bowman & Hurry,
1993). Furthermore, studies have found only weak to moderate correlations
between objective and perceptual measures of uncertainty (e.g., Tosi,
Aldag, & Storey, 1973; Boyd, Dess, & Rasheed, 1993). Therefore, it is im-
portant to consider how uncertainty is perceived by decision makers to
explain more accurately how they make RO investments, and to explain
observed deviations from normative RO models. In the section that follows,
the decision maker of interest would be the (potential) investor in a JV. Since
the investor is usually a corporate entity, the discussion is subject to the usual
caveat about generalizing from individual to group- or organization-level
decisions.
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Heuristics and Biases Influencing Real Option Decisions
It has long been established that managers cannot gather all possible in-
formation from their environment, due to limited attention and information
processing capacities (Simon, 1955). As a result decision makers are not able
to make complete or fully accurate representations of their complex envi-
ronments on which their actions are based (Simon, 1955; March & Simon,
1958). Instead, decision makers rely on a number of heuristics, i.e., simpli-
fying strategies or rules of thumb, to deal with complex and uncertain de-
cision situations. Normally these heuristics are useful and effective, but
sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors that tend to be universal
and predictable (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a). Drawing on prospect the-
ory, Miller and Shapira (2004) found evidence of systematic biases in the
valuation of ROs, which they attributed to whether choices were framed as
losses or gains. However, a number of other heuristics may also inﬂuence
the valuation and the striking of options.13
Overconfidence and Control
First, decision makers tend to be overconfident about the judgments they
make. In an experiment in which subjects were asked to set the lower and
upper bounds of the expected returns of different investment alternatives,
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977) showed that the range of possible
outcomes of investments is systematically underestimated. Similarly, Shapira
(1995) argued that decision makers systematically ignore very low probability
events, even when they could have signiﬁcant consequences for the organ-
ization. Thus, only a part of the range of possible outcomes of an investment
is considered. If so, decision makers will systematically underestimate the
volatility of the value of a JV. This will in turn lead to a systematic under-
valuation of the corresponding option.
Second, decision makers overestimate the degree of control they have
over the outcome of their strategies. They also assume that if things do not
go according to plan they can turn things around with additional effort,
even if outcomes are exogenously determined in reality. Thus, decision
makers tend to see exogenous uncertainty as being endogenous (Langer &
Roth, 1975; Schwenk, 1984). This will result in different investment incen-
tives than those associated with RO logic. Based on these two arguments
we propose:
Proposition 12. Ceteris paribus, investors are prone to underinvest in real
options and therefore take a larger than optimal initial share in JVs.
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Anchoring
A third relevant heuristic is anchoring. Decision makers revise their
judgment about the value of variables that are crucial to their decisions
when new information becomes available. However, these adjustments are
generally not large enough. Thus, the values of the decision variables are
biased toward the decision makers’ initial values (Tversky & Kahneman,
1982a). Likewise, decision makers’ valuation of the call option in a JV
during the holding period will be biased toward their initial valuation of
the option at the time of the JV formation. They will perceive uncertainty
to resolve slower or to a lesser extent than it actually resolves. As a re-
sult, options will be exercised or abandoned sub-optimally. Therefore, we
propose:
Proposition 13. Ceteris paribus, relative to the RO ideal, investors in a
call option in a JV are prone to buy out their partner too late or abandon
the JV at the expiration date even if the option is ‘‘in the money’’ (i.e., the
value of the JV exceeds the strike price).
Availability
A fourth one includes that decision makers assess the probabilities that
events will occur by the ease with which occurrences of a similar nature can
be thought of. This availability heuristic can also lead to biases. Some events
seem to occur more frequently than others because they are easier to think
of, even if they do not actually occur more frequently in practice (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982b). The probability of these more available events will
be overestimated while that of unavailable events will be underestimated
(Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 2002). The availability or
ease with which events can be recalled will depend on a decision maker’s
experience (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Indeed Calori, Johnson, and
Sarnin (1994) found empirical evidence of experience having an effect on
CEOs’ cognitive representations of the environment. Therefore, we expect
top managers’ subjective perception of uncertainty, and thereby their val-
uation of options, to be dependent on their prior experiences. Accordingly,
we propose:
Proposition 14. Ceteris paribus, the negative relationship between ex-
ogenous uncertainty and (initial) share in a JV will be inﬂuenced by the
level of prior experience that makes the source(s) of uncertainty more
salient to the investor.
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Role-Related Effects
Furthermore, Ireland, Hitt, Bettis, and de Porras (1987) found evidence that
perceived uncertainty varies across different management levels in the or-
ganization. They argued that managers at different levels of the organiza-
tion would have different experiences and access to different types of
information. Adner and Levinthal (2004) argued that actors at different
levels of the organization would have different perspectives and incentives
inﬂuencing option investment decisions. Furthermore, managers will focus
selectively on different aspects of the environment, including uncertainty,
which are more relevant to their functional specialty (Dearborn & Simon,
1958). Therefore, we expect:
Proposition 15a. Ceteris paribus, the negative relationship between the
source(s) of exogenous uncertainty and (initial) share in a JV will be in-
ﬂuenced by the level of the decision maker in the organization’s hierarchy.
Proposition 15b. Ceteris paribus, the negative relationship between the
source(s) of exogenous uncertainty and (initial) share in a JV will be in-
ﬂuenced by the functional specialty of the decision maker.
Besides these individual-level factors, organizational-level, institutional,
and country factors may also lead to biases or challenges to make RO
decisions (e.g., Hurry et al., 1992; Adner, 2007). Accordingly, future re-
search should also examine these factors. Finally, future research should
also study how these systematic biases can be reduced to make more optimal
RO decisions. A number of bias-reducing strategies and routines have been
proposed in the literature. For instance, Janney and Dess (2004) identiﬁed
guidelines such as ex ante specifying decision rules, separating the role of
option writer and option exerciser, and making use of external auditors to
access exit strategies, which can be helpful to offset biases. Therefore, it
would be interesting to assess whether or not ﬁrms who have such strategies
and routines in place make more optimal RO decisions, and if so what the
conditions and costs of implementing such guidelines are.
Implications
To summarize, additional attention to behavioral decision theory can help
to advance our understanding of how ROs are valued and managed. While
Miller and Shapira (2004) focused on individuals’ evaluation of possible
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losses and gains, we have examined biases in the assessment of uncertainty.
More speciﬁcally, we identiﬁed a number of relevant heuristics and ex-
plained how they could lead to biases in the way uncertainty is perceived.
These biases in turn will inﬂuence the valuation and management of options.
Therefore, our insights are all the more relevant for managers aiming to
make optimal RO decisions. Furthermore, we distinguished between sub-
jective and objective uncertainty and pointed out the importance of this
distinction for research.
CONCLUSION
This paper provides an extensive survey of the RO literature on JVs, which
contributes to this body of work in three ways. First, we reviewed the RO
literature and a number of oft used alternative theories. By highlighting
similarities and differences between the different theories, we have found
RO theory to be complementary in most cases. However, in some instances
RO theory seemed to be overlapping with or contradicting other theories at
ﬁrst sight. Therefore, it is important for future research to integrate these
theories by investigating and reﬁning their respective boundary conditions,
both theoretically and empirically. The study of strategic alliances in general
stands to gain from such efforts.
In this paper, we have also highlighted the need for integrating the
different stages of the JV’s life cycle. In doing so, we indicated a number of
gaps and contradictions in the RO literature on JVs. We outlined several
opportunities for future research by incorporating explanatory variables in a
particular stage that previously have only been used in the context of
another stage. Addressing these issues empirically in future research will
advance our understanding of RO theory, particularly with respect to JVs.
Finally, we have examined the behavioral aspects of making RO invest-
ments. By linking RO theory with behavioral decision theory, we hope to
introduce additional realism in the use of ROs, especially JVs. This reﬁnement
is all the more relevant as it can inform researchers about how practitioners
use or misuse ROs in practice.
Overall, we have demonstrated that RO theory is an important perspec-
tive to study JVs for researchers in strategy and practitioners, and opened
avenues for further research both in combining RO research with other
theories, and in integrating what we know about different JV decisions and
stages. Given the promise demonstrated by RO research to date, but also the
gaps and inconsistencies in existing models and results, further research on
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JVs from an RO perspective is well warranted. The research areas and
predictions presented here should inform such research.
NOTES
1. For a review of JV types, purposes and scope, see Pisano, Russo, and Teece
(1988) and Martin (2002).
2. However, we believe that our arguments are also broadly relevant for other
types of JVs, which face their own distinct sources of uncertainty. For instance,
ventures for joint product introduction must deal with uncertainty concerning design
acceptance by buyers and regulators, competitive reaction, etc. (Pisano et al., 1988;
Martin & Mitchell, 1998).
3. An explicit option is a contractual clause that speciﬁes the terms including the
conditions under which additional equity can be acquired from a partner (Reuer &
Tong, 2005). Chi and Seth (2002) provided an extensive overview of different option
speciﬁcations. These include options with predetermined exercise prices, ﬂexible or
ﬁxed termination dates, or a predetermined pricing mechanism.
4. The holder of a call (put) option has the right but not the obligation, to buy
(sell) an underlying asset at the contractually determined strike price until (American
option) or at (European option) a certain expiry date (maturity).
5. Option valuation models assume that it is possible to specify the probability
distribution of the future value of an asset. Therefore, the concept of uncertainty used
in RO theory is actually closer to what Knight (1921) refers to as risk. Nevertheless,
we will refer to this as ‘‘uncertainty’’ as this is done throughout most of the literature.
6. Li et al. (2007) also touch upon the distinction between exogenous and endo-
genous uncertainty in their general review of RO research.
7. Williamson (1985, p. 59) emphasizes the conditional effect of exogenous uncer-
tainty: ‘‘The inﬂuence of [exogenous] uncertainty on economic organizations is con-
ditional. Speciﬁcally, an increase in parametric [i.e., exogenous] uncertainty is a matter
of little consequence for transactions that are nonspeciﬁc.’’ Leiblein (2003) concluded
that empirical ﬁndings in the TCE literature are consistent with Williamson’s (1985)
argument that exogenous uncertainty has a conditional effect. A few studies have
postulated a direct effect of exogenous uncertainty on make-versus-buy decisions, but
reported mixed or inconsistent results (e.g., Walker & Weber, 1984, 1987).
8. Some studies in the bargaining power literature have looked at the effects of
government restrictions on mode of entry. However, to our knowledge, they have
focused almost exclusively on the choice between shared ownership and sole own-
ership (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 1990). Only Blodgett (1991) has examined the effects of
government restrictions on the ownership distribution of JVs from a bargaining
power perspective.
9. Other JV studies have contrasted TCE and RO theory in different ways. Folta
(1998) argued that RO theory and TCE contradict rather than complement each
other. Speciﬁcally, he argued that TCE emphasizes the use of commitment to reduce
uncertainty, while RO theory emphasizes ﬂexibility to deal with uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, he proposed that there is a trade-off between these two stances, and that
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this trade-off is more prominent under conditions of high uncertainty. Conversely,
Chi (2000) and Reuer and Tong (2005) argued that explicit call options in JVs are
one of several contractual safeguards that can be used to reduce transaction costs –
thus suggesting that RO theory and TCE are overlapping. Clearly, these studies raise
interesting questions for future research, the most critical of which we outlined above
in the section dealing with JVs as (explicit) ROs. On balance, however, current
empirical evidence in studies of initial JV equity stakes suggests that RO theory and
TCE are complements.
10. Current dividends are a function of market size, ﬁrst-mover advantages, and
learning opportunities. The residual resource value is determined by the uniqueness,
transferability to other markets, and durability of the underlying resources. The
exercise price depends on whether there is an explicit contractual option, and the
proprietariness of the option. The value of the option depends on the amount of
exogenous uncertainty, the threat of preemption, and the presence of unique com-
plementary resources (Miller & Folta, 2002).
11. We discuss learning in this section because the range of its manifestations and
effects is better understood in connection with alliance evolution and (in)stability
than solely in connection with terms at founding (initial distribution of equity).
Conversely, the literature on agency theory has relatively little to say about alliance
instability (other than as adjustment of terms, following a logic similar to transaction
cost predictions), so we do not treat it separately in this section.
12. In accordance with the existing literature, we focus here on call options.
However, a similar argument can be made for put options that give the holder the
right to sell its share. The likelihood that a ﬁrm has an explicit put option should also
be higher when it expects its bargaining power to deteriorate during the life of the JV.
13. Although Miller and Shapira (2004) provided the respondents in their exper-
iment with objective information about the distribution of uncertainty, they sug-
gested that biases in the assessments of probabilities might also be relevant to the
valuation of options.
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